When there are fewer securities than states of nature,4 three problems immediately arise:
1. How are we to evaluate alternative allocations? In the absence of a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in different states by different individuals will not in general be equal. Thus, it is not particularly meaningful to compare economies with a full set of Arrow-Debreu markets (which will be Pareto optimal in the conventional sense) with economies lacking such markets. 5 We propose the following criterion: An allocation will be said to be a (constrained) Paretooptimal allocation if a centralized planner, who was constrained to purchase factors and sell commodities through the given market structures, could not make anyone better off without making someone worse off. 6 2. What is the objective of each firm? Conventional theory has the firm maximizing its stock market value; prices of the commodities that an individual buys are unaffected by the action of the firm, so by increasing the wealth of the stockholder, the welfare of each stockholder is maximized. This is true whether the individual is a small or a large shareholder in the company. In the absence of a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, there is no such presumption for value maximization.
3. In order for the individual to evaluate alternative production plans, he must be able to ascertain their effect on the price of a share (on the value of the firm). In the Arrow-Debreu model, there are prices for outputs (inputs) in each state of nature, and the net value of the firm is simply the difference between the value of outputs and inputs using these prices.7 But how is the firm to evaluate alterna-4. The problems discussed here may arise even when there is no uncertainty, e.g., when only a few of the continuum of "qualities" of various commodities that might be produced actually are produced. The analysis of markets for risky assets provides a context in which these questions may be analyzed with somewhat greater clarity and precision than in the more general case. Moreover, it will be clear from the discussion below that the existence of fewer securities than states of nature is neither necessary nor sufficient for all the difficulties that are about to be discussed to occur.
5. As Borch has done; see, e.g., his "The Economics of Uncertainty" in M. Shubik, ed., Essays in Mathematical Economics, In Honor of Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 197-210.
6. This is equivalent to P. Diamond's concept of a "Constrained Pareto Optimal"; i.e., the income delivered to any individual is constrained to be a linear function of the outputs of the different firms in the economy. See This paper is primarily concerned with the third problem.8 We shall present a specific example in which there is available a simple and plausible method of evaluation of alternative production plans, in which firms act like competitive price takers, but which, when firms maximize their stock market value, does not lead to an optimal allocation (in the sense defined above). More generally, we shall use our example to give us some insights into why the market allocation resulting from value-maximizing firms is not likely to be optimal.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
Before investigating in detail our specific example, we shall outline the basic structure of our economy. Our economy consists of n+1 firms (industries)9 and mn individuals. We shall consider a simple two-period model, in which a single factor input, denoted by I (for investment), is taken in the first period and transformed into a single commodity output the second.' Firms (industries) will differ from one another in the pattern of returns across the states of nature, not in the commodities that they produce.
A. Individual Behavior
Each individual begins "life" with a given endowment of the factor, Ii, and a given set of ownership claims on the various firms. 9. For most of the analysis, we shall assume that n is fixed. In Section V, we shall consider briefly what happens when n is also determined endogenously. This is discussed at greater length in J. E. Stiglitz, "The Degree of Product Differentiation in Monopolistic Competition: An Example" (forthcoming).
Returns and Separability in Portfolio Allocation
1. At the cost of a slight increase in notational complexity, the model may be easily extended to the case where there is a vector of inputs. The case where there are several outputs introduces an element of price uncertainty. The uncertainty associated with relative prices, though undoubtedly of great importance, introduces additional problems to be discussed elsewhere. 
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/3,) is the proportion of the shares of the ith firm owned by the jth individual 3 at the beginning of the first period (E .,8i==l). If the firm were to do no investment in the first period, the individual would receive f3ij of the output of the firm in the second period. The individual can, of course, sell his ownership claims in the ith firm to purchase shares in some other firm, and in general we would expect that he will rearrange his "portfolio." Moreover, the value of the individual's initial ownership claims in the ith firm will depend on the level of investment it undertakes. If the ith firm invests I, and the total market value of the firm is Vi,4 then the value of the equity of the initial shareholders is Vi-Ii, the total value of the firm less the capital raised to finance the new investment.5 The ModiglianiMiller theorem assures that the value of the firm is independent of how it finances its new investment; i.e., it does not depend on the debt-equity ratio of the firm.6 Hence the total initial wealth of the jth individual Woj is just (1)
We i = inivi+ lokj (VaI t vi The individual looks at the various securities that are available 3. Here and elsewhere, we use superscripts j to denote individuals and subscripts i to denote firms. (Later, when there is no ambiguity, we shall drop the superscripts and subscripts.) 4. Our "numeraire" is I. All economic activity (trading and investment decisions) in this model occurs in the first period; hence, we are only concerned with the determination of the value of the firms at that time. Extending the analysis to a multiperiod (in particular, to an infinite time) horizon involves several essential difficulties, including the fact that the value of the firm today depends on its expected value tomorrow, which depends, in turn, on its expected value the day after, and so on; in a deterministic context, these problems have been discussed in K. Shell Vqj= Di(ei, . . . , en, r, Woi) j (4) differs from the conventional demand functions in that, instead of writing demand as a function of the price of the ith firm's securities, it is written as a function of the returns per dollar in the ith security. We can, however, rewrite (4) into a slightly more "conventional" form. Because of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, we can, without loss of generality, assume that the firm issues only shares, so that the total value of equities is equal to the total value of the firm. Thus, the return per dollar invested in the jth firm is just equal to the total returns to the ith firm divided by the total value of its equities. Om) . 8. We allow short sales and borrowing, i.e.,
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9. Throughout this paper we assume the existence of a perfectly safe firm. The analysis may easily be modified if there is no such firm, provided that there exists a safe security (bonds with no default risk); the market allocation will still be nonoptimal. We make the assumption of the existence of a safe industry because one of the questions on which we wish to focus is whether there is a systematic misallocation of resources to the safe industry relative to the risky.
We have thus characterized the "demand" side of the market. We now turn to a more detailed description of the firms.
B. Firm Behavior
Each firm is characterized by a production technology, which specifies the output in state 9, if the firm invests Ih and chooses production plan ej: 1. As we noted in the introduction, it is not obvious that, when there are fewer securities than states of nature, value maximization is in the interests of the shareholders. Our motivation in using that assumption here is to make the results of our model as comparable as possible to those of the conventional Arrow-Debreu model; and because it is a behavioral rule that has often been suggested firms ought to use, we believe it is worthwhile pursuing its implications. See In the example to be analyzed in detail below, there is, however, another natural valuation function. For the moment, our concern is understanding the basic structure of the model. For this, all we need is to postulate some valuation function of the firm that leads to a determinate level of investment, Ih, as a function of the outputs and market valuations of the other firms, or some marketdetermined parameters (such as q(0) in the Arrow-Debreu model).3
C. Market Equilibrium
Finally, we come to a statement of the conditions for equilibrium of our economy. An equilibrium is described by a set of firm valuations, Vi, investment levels, I1, and choices of plans, A, such that given the levels of investment, firm valuations, and choices of plans of all of the other firms, each firm believes that it is maximizing the stock market value of its initial shareholders; such that 3. We need to impose one further condition on the firm evaluation function: in equilibrium, the price that the firm "predicts" for itself at the level of investment and for the production plan it undertakes must be the value actually obtained. these factors, in return giving claims on their output next period. The levels of investment and choices of production plans are made to maximize the value of the original shareholders' equity, where the valuation is determined by some (as yet unspecified) valuation function. Equilibrium requires that investment by firms equal the supply of I by individuals (equilibrium in the factor market) and "exchange equilibrium" -at the given market prices of the securities no individual wishes to exchange his ownership claims on one firm for ownership claims on another. The timing and notation is set out in Table I .
What remains to be done is a precise specification of the firm's valuation function. We do this in the context of a specific example that has played a central role in the development of the literature on uncertainty and portfolio analysis: the mean variance model. We shall denote by CR and uR the standard deviation and mean of the return per dollar invested in the optimal risky portfolio; let x*, equal the optimal proportion of risky assets held in the ith security. Then Individual's Portfolio Allocation gives all possible mean standard deviations from investing only in the risky assets in different proportions, R gives the optimal risky portfolio, S denotes terminal wealth if all were invested in the safe asset, and SR gives the opportunity locus. E is the equilibrium.
III. DETERMINATION OF THE LEVEL OF INVESTMENT IN

B. Equilibrium Market Valuations
The great advantage of using the mean variance model is that, in equilibrium, the values of the different firms will be related to one another in a simple and intuitively plausible way: for each firm, we can calculate the certainty equivalent of its uncertain income; the market valuation is just the certainty equivalent return discounted by the safe rate of return, r. The certainty equivalent of its income is just its mean return less a risk discount factor times the "riskiness" of the firm's income, where "riskiness" is simply the sum of its own variance plus its covariance with all other firms. Hence 8 (19) Vi= EXi -k4E (Xi,-EX,) (Xj-EXj) r where k is the risk discount factor.9 It is important to observe that kc, like any other "price," is the same for all firms.
This valuation formula has one important property to which attention should be drawn: observe that if we have two perfectly correlated firms, so zXi (0) with the special case where the firm's only decision is I. We shall, moreover, assume that all firms are independent, i.e., Ij -0 equilibrium curve, it can be shown that 1EXj is an increasing function of r, from which it follows that along (14), k is an increasing function of r.8 Clearly, the two curves must intersect once and only once.
E. Pareto Optimality
We now wish to compare the market equilibrium described in the previous subsection with the optimal allocation. We wish to maximize U(EY, ay), where ay is defined in (31). Optimality re- 
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The differences between the marginal increase in average returns of the ith asset and the safe asset should be proportional to the marginal increase in variance, with the proportionality factor being the marginal rate of substitution divided by twice the standard deviation of the risky assets. This should be contrasted with the market equilibrium, which may be written, using (22) and (28), as U2 2g'?gj U2 1
dg.2 (37b) h-h'=----d-.
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The equations are identical, except that the proportionality factor is twice that of the optimal allocation, i.e., the "price" of risk is twice what it should be. The resulting effect on the resource allocation may be seen diagrammatically as follows.
Assume that all the risky firms are identical. Recall from the previous subsection that the opportunity locus is concave. Then the optimal point P is simply the tangency of the indifference curve with the opportunity locus ( Figure II) . It is clear from a comparison of P and C that P always lies to the right of C: the market allocation always results in less investment in the risky industries than the optimal allocation. More generally, it is possible to show that, although the market allocation always lies along the social opportunity locus,9 i.e., is "efficient," it always results in too much investment in the safe industry.
F. Nonindependent Returns
When, however, we drop the assumption of independence, the economy will not even be "efficient," i.e., it will operate "below" its mean variance opportunity locus. To see this, assume that the returns to any firm may be described by ance terms, the level of investment yielded by (40) will be approximately that yielded by (41); indeed, not only are we "approximately" efficient, but we are "approximately" Pareto optimal.3
IV. CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE
In the preceding section, we considered the market allocation of investment, assuming that the firm had no choice of technique. An equally important question is, do market value-maximizing firms make the "correct" decisions about the choice of technique; i.e., if a firm can reduce its own variance -but only at the expense of a reduction in its mean or an increase in its collinearity with the market -will it make the correct "trade-off" calculations?
The results we obtain here very much parallel those obtained in the previous section: if all firms are independent, the economy operates on its efficiency frontier; the only distortion arises from a disparity between the marginal rate of transformation between mean and standard deviation (the slope of the efficiency frontier) and the marginal rate of substitution (the slope of the indifference curve). On the other hand, if the firms are not perfectly independent, the economy will not even be on its mean variance frontier -too much weight will be placed on the own variance terms relative to the covariance terms.
A. Independent Firms
Because when firms are independent in the mean variance model, the market valuations depend only on the mean and variance of output, we can completely describe the set of (relevant) technologies by the function 
B. Nonindependent Returns
When the firms are not independent the specification of the technology is only slightly more complicated. We assume for sim-4. To ensure that we have interior solution, all we require is that at fixed I, successive decreases in standard deviation can only be purchased by successively larger decreases in EX,. An immediate corollary of these results is the following: if we confront the economy with a choice between two different projects costing the same amount, identical in mean, but differing in their own variances and covariances from other projects, the total market variance will be independent of which firm undertakes the project; but if we confront different firms in the economy with the same choice, the decision made will in general differ from firm to firm.
Even when the own variance terms are small relative to the covariance terms, the firm's "trade-off" between Ei and mi is twice what it should be. Of course, if ei is small for all i, the consequences of this may be negligible. In the limiting case where Ei O (the technology is of the form Ii= i(mi, EXj) ), the economy is "approximately" efficient and Pareto optimal if there are a large number of firms (mi is much less than X mj).
i7j C. Discrete Choices
These results are rather gratifying. They accord with our intuition: if the only "risk" a firm is "selling" is associated with a common market factor and if the individual firm is small relative to the market as a whole, we obtain the usual competitive results on Pareto optimality. When the firm is "selling" in addition some risk not associated with the market, it places too much emphasis on this.
To obtain these results, we assumed that the firm faced a "continuum" of techniques. In practice firms are likely to face a set of discrete choices, or, if there is a "continuum" of techniques, it is likely to be defined over a narrower range of values of (et, mi, EX1), so that corner solutions are more likely to occur. The emphasis on own variance may well result in the wrong (from the social point of view) decisions with respect to production plans (see Figure  Vc) . automobiles one could infer the market valuation of tail fins, chrome, alternative sizes, vinyl seats, cloth seats, etc. But if the kind of automobile that a given producer is manufacturing has already been determined, these "constituent" prices are of no interest to him. His only concern is the price of the composite commodity that he produces. If the producer should act like a price taker, then it is easy to see that the market equilibrium would be a "constrained" Pareto optimal, i.e., given the kinds of automobiles produced, the amounts produced are "correct. We have attempted to formulate a simple alternative model. The example that we have analyzed in detail has employed the familiar mean variance model; this is both a limitation and a strength of the model. For it is likely that it is in terms of some such simple parametrizations that firms make their decisions. The model has the further advantage that firms do act as price takers: they take as given the market rate of interest and the risk discount factor. Indeed, the "pricing" system that we have suggested firms use has all the properties of a normal pricing system; in particular, in equilibrium the values of all firms may be calculated in terms of the same valuation function (just as in the Arrow-Debreu model).-, It has the further property that in certain limiting cases, where there is no choice of technique and the own variances are negligible relative to the covariances with the other firms in the economy, the market allocation is approximately Pareto optimal; in that case, firms can simply ignore that part of their own variance which is uncorrelated with the rest of the market. Both casual empiricism and econometric investigation suggest, however, that own variances are significant in explaining market valuations; 2 that firms are "risk averse" with respect to investment opportunities that are uncorrelated with the business cycle; 3 and that, although the market for the trading of securities is probably one'of the most competitive markets in existence, the firms do not act as perfect competitors in issuing securities: they are aware that (at least in the short run corresponding to the time scale of our model) increasing their size will increase their market valuation less than in proportion. It is these characteristics of the markets for risky assets that we have attempted to capture in our model.
It seems clear that the result of the model, that the market economy will not be Pareto optimal,4 both because firms fail to take adequate account of covariances with other firms and because they perceive that their value will not increase in proportion to their scale in the short run, suggests that the stock market may not be as ''efficient" a mechanism for allocating resources as has until now been thought to be the case and, in particular, as has been suggested by the previously formulated models of the stock market. Extensions of the model, allowing, for instance, for free entry of firms, reinforce the results reported here. In that case, not only will the total level of investment in the risky industries be too small, but also the number of firms will not be optimal. The economy will be operating below its mean variance frontier (allowing for a variable number of firms) even when the firms are independent.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
That a competitive economy would lead, as if by an invisible hand, to a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources has long been held to be one of its most attractive features. In the context of a static economy with no uncertainty, rigorous proofs of this result, as well as its converse, that every Pareto-optimal allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium (with some redistribution of initial endowments), have been presented; and the limitations on the theorem, the importance of externalities, increasing returns to scale (nonconvexities), and public goods have been extensively discussed. Arrow and Debreu have shown, moreover, how this model may formally be extended to include dynamic economies and uncertainty. But the markets required by this model are not present in any observed economy. Indeed, we have considered a case where 3. If own variance terms were small relative to the correlation with the market, firms could simply ignore the own variance terms; they would be diversified out by the market.
4. Except in the limiting cases already noted.
all individuals would purchase Arrow-Debreu securities in the same proportions, were they available. As far as consumers are concerned, they are perfectly content to have the securities provided by a single mutual fund. In such a situation, if there were even the slightest increase in costs of transacting in separate securities as opposed to mutual funds, it is likely that only a limited number of such markets would exist. Yet the prices that the ArrowDebreu markets would provide for the guidance of firms in making decisions are essential for firms to make the correct allocative decisions.
In analyzing the allocation of investment resources in an economy with a stock market, we face two questions:
1. Do the prices for the different capital goods (different securities) correctly reflect the social returns from those goods (securities), or do the prices simply reflect, as Keynes suggested they did,5 our expectations of what others' expectations will be of the price of the good (security) in the future? Indeed, Hahn and Shell and Stiglitz have argued that, in the absence of a complete set of future markets, the competitive allocation among alternative capital assets might not (indeed, from their analysis, it appeared likely that it would not) be efficient. 6 2. Even if the prices for the different securities correctly reflect the social returns, will they lead to an efficient investment pattern? It is with this question that this paper has been primarily concerned. By limiting ourselves to a two-period model and by assuming for most of the analysis that all individuals are in agreement about the pattern of returns for each firm, we have been able to abstract from the first problem. Nonetheless, we have argued that the market's allocation of resources between safe and risky assets, the allocation among risky assets, and the choice of techniques will not be optimal.
The results suggest that the "invisible hand" of competition may not work as well as had been previously thought. In some sense, these limitations on the optimality of competitive markets are far more serious than the restrictions that had been noticed earlier, for we are concerned here with one of the most fundamental of all economic activities, the allocation of resource among alternative investment opportunities. Moreover, while externalities can be corrected by the appropriate use of tax policy, public goods will necessarily be provided by the government; and if there were only a few increasing returns to scale industries, they could be either nationalized or regulated by the government, while the rest of the economy remained under private control; the problem of the competitive misallocation among alternative investment opportunities does not appear to be so easily corrected. Some of the problems that we have raised for the competitive economy are equally problems for the decentralized socialist economy. Whether in fact any centralized decision-making mechanism would, in practice, give a better allocation remains a moot question. Much of the discussion of portfolio analysis has been conducted in terms of the mean and standard deviation of the rate of return. Since it is consumption in which the individual is ultimately interested, it seems more natural to evaluate alternative investment programs in terms of the wealth (consumption) that they provide at the end of the period. Nonetheless, it should perhaps be pointed out that, if individuals evaluated alternative income streams in terms of the mean and standard deviation of the rate of return, the market allocation would not be Pareto optimal even if there were stochastic constant returns to scale in the risky industry and it acted as a price taker. To see this, assume that the safe industry has a decreasing returns to scale production function, and that there is a single risky industry that acted competitively. The social opportunity locus will then be a concave function, as depicted in Figure  VII , with intercept with the vertical axis equal to h', (I). The individual takes the rate of interest as given, and hence faces a straight line opportunity locus. If the allocation to the safe industry is I, then the intercept with the vertical axis of the individual's opportunity locus is h', (Is)>h', (I) if L<I. Because of the assumption that there are stochastic constant returns to scale in the risky industry and that firms in the risky industry assume that the ratio of the value per unit of investment is independent of the level of investment, in competitive equilibrium the mean and standard deviations when investing in the risky asset alone are independent of the level of investment in the risky asset (and just equal to h and g, respectively). If all individuals were identical a competitive equilibrium would be a point such as C in Figure VII , where the slope of the private opportunity locus equals the marginal rate of substitution between mean and standard deviation at the intersection of the private and social opportunity loci. But note that the optimal allocation again always lies at a higher level of investment in the risk industry than does the market allocation. 
